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Abstract. After France, Bulgaria became the 
second EU country to enact an open-ended ban 
on hydraulic fracturing in early 2012. This gov-
ernment action was a radical departure from an 
initially friendly, even enthusiastic stance on 
unconventional gas development. It resulted in 
months of unprecedented, broad political pro-
test from environmental groups and local com-
munities. The conflict was interpreted as one in-
volving old questions about Bulgaria’s orienta-
tion toward Russia or the West. In neighbouring 
Romania, Bulgaria’s U-turn on shale gas ener-
gized a protest movement which had been relatively weak. In a 
turbulent election-year context, political leaders scrambled to 
deal with highly symbolic issues. A new government introduced a 
moratorium but ended it less than a year later. Another U-turn in 
public policy happened. Romania parted from Bulgaria’s example 
and set out to move forward on shale gas, aiding foreign investors. 
Massive protests against the policy and the investors surged, en-
circling the drilling operations. In both countries, public mistrust 
in institutions, environmental regulations and due process of law 
is a significant factor of political risk for energy companies. 
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Introduction 
Although they are very distinct countries with divergent energy 
supply situations, Bulgaria and Romania share many economic 
                                                             
1 The Nabucco pipeline was planned to be constructed from the Turkish-
Bulgarian border via Romania and Hungary to Austria. It would supply 
natural gas from the Caspian Sea, i.e. Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field. The 
and political features as well as energy policy challenges. In terms 
of per capita GDP, Bulgaria is the poorest, Romania the second-
poorest nation of the EU, which both joined in 2007 (Eurostat, 
2013). Both postcommunist countries are hungry for economic de-
velopment. Both had to seek EU and International Monetary Fund 
aid during the financial crisis years, and imposed austerity 
measures which triggered citizen unrest and anti-government pro-
tests. Both nations have very turbulent politics. Both countries are 
still deeply troubled by corruption and deficiencies in the rule of 
law and justice system. The European Commission still closely 
monitors and criticizes the slow pace of reform (Economist, 2014). 
Their energy geography must be put in an EU context. Both na-
tions have been deeply involved in the Southeast European corri-
dor gas pipeline politics (e.g. Nabucco and South Stream). Both 
hoped to become key pillars of an Asian-European gas bridge, 
adding their own interconnector networks to diversify gas infra-
structure. They could theoretically play a major role for Europe’s 
energy supply security. The failure of the Nabucco pipeline pro-
ject1 in 2013 was a disaster for both, but especially for Romania; 
Bulgaria still has a role in Gazprom’s South Stream. Both coun-
tries have also set their sights on offshore gas drilling in the Black 
Sea. Finally, both countries have substantial unconventional gas 
reserves. This could mean not only a most-wanted economic boost 
but also more independence from Russian gas imports. 
Since discovery, both countries went through a highly contro-
versial debate on shale gas. Emergent issues around the hydraulic 
fracturing (fracking) technology energized environmental activ-
ism in both countries. Linked with anti-government civil unrest 
and protests, the anti-fracking movement grew surprisingly fast, 
putting immense political pressure on the governments.  
Both governments first invited investors to apply for conces-
sions and welcomed the new opportunities. But then both govern-
ments made a U-turn, giving in to enormous pressure from the 
street – both in the context of polarizing elections. Bulgaria’s gov-
ernment reacted by outlawing the use of hydraulic fracturing and 
revoking drilling licences in early 2012. Romania also introduced 
a moratorium in 2012. This one, however, did not stand: Bucharest 
gave it up quickly, clearing the way for shale gas development. 
Moreover, the two countries’ controversies over shale overlap. 
It was Bulgaria’s protest-induced total ban in early 2012 which put 
highly political project was burdened with many difficulties. By June 
2013, the project was finally dead as the Shah-Deniz consortium opted for 
an alternative pipeline route, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). 
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Romania’s anti-shale protests in motion. Protest organisers in the 
North and South cooperated, eased by the fact that U.S. firm Chev-
ron was the major investor and preferred protest target in both 
countries. With Bucharest ending the moratorium, a new focus lay 
on the shale gas reserves located on the Romanian-Bulgarian bor-
der: Southern communities began to fear that despite their own 
country’s ban, fracking activities on the Romanian side might con-
taminate and poison water and ground on their own side of the 
border. Bulgarians began to stage rallies in support of Romanian 
protests, and activists from both countries merged their campaigns 
in border towns (Novinite.com, 2013a, 2013b). They brought 
about the motto “Two Countries, Same Water – Two Nations, One 
Fight”. Solidarity demonstrations also happened in front of the Ro-
manian embassy in Sofia (Gaydazhieva, 2013). 
As will be shown in this article, the developments of shale gas 
controversies in both countries have much in common. However, 
Bulgaria and Romania do differ in key contexts and the current 
government policies. In both countries, uncertainty, turbulence 
and surprises from political sources – in other words, political risk 
– is an eminent factor for any investor, but particularly in the con-
text of a new and globally controversial technology. On top of this, 
opposition flared against foreign companies, seen as intruders. 
Political risk may be defined as “any political change that alters 
the expected outcome and value of a given economic action by 
changing the probability of achieving business objectives” (PwC 
& Eurasia Group, 2006). Though Bulgaria and Romania are part 
of the EU and therefore of a politically low-risk bloc compared to 
other parts of the world, the two countries score higher on any po-
litical risk mapper’s assessment. The business environment is not 
as consistent and predictable as one might assume, and whoever 
trusts in the reliability of governmental and judicial decisions may 
learn instructive lessons from the shale gas cases presented here. 
Political events have been very fast-moving, and companies had 
to grapple with bouncing political logic and government reactions 
to threats and opportunities brought about by street-level action.  
With a new and controversial technology, systematic communi-
cation efforts by governments and companies to gain social ac-
ceptance should have been a key component of contingency plan-
ning. The absence of such efforts greatly increased political risk. 
Bulgaria: The Road to the Ban 
While neighbouring Romania is relatively rich and diverse in its 
energy supply, Bulgaria is not. It is relatively poor in natural en-
ergy resources. It has limited lignite (brown coal) mining but has 
to import most all oil and gas, most from Russia. Next to burning 
coal, Bulgaria relies heavily on nuclear power. Atomic energy en-
joys popular support and enables the country to export electricity.  
As energy exporter, transit hub, distribution and logistics base, 
Bulgaria plays a significant role for South East Europe. This is due 
to its geography. Bulgaria has also been intensively developing its 
renewable sector. Its wind power sector grows fast. Overall, the 
energy sector, including major assets held by the state’s Bulgarian 
Energy Holding, is well developed. Yet the country has suffered 
disillusionments about making the country an energy hub because 
power plants, pipeline, and other projects ran into economic, tech-
nical or political troubles. “Bulgaria has become notorious for the 
failure of many big energy projects” (Stoyanov, 2013). 
Bulgaria’s conventional oil and gas production used to be sig-
nificant before the 1990s but has declined significantly since then. 
Today, the country imports almost all of its consumed oil and nat-
ural gas. From the 1970s through 2008, Bulgaria used to have a 
preferred relationship with Russian supplier Gazprom, with rela-
tively low gas prices. The situation changed as Gazprom contract 
conditions changed and gas prices rose sharply, leading to angry 
citizen protests from 2008 onwards. The tendency is, however, 
that the country becomes more and more dependent on Russian 
imports. Local natural gas resources can satisfy only four percent 
of total consumption. Initially, Russian gas delivered through a 
pipeline built in the 1970s was used only by industry, but in the 
1990s district heating began using gas. Directly, few households 
use natural gas; the share recently was around two percent, much 
lower than the European average (Georgiev, 2010). 
After a local gas supply crisis in Sofia and major other cities in 
2008, Bulgaria also suffered heavily from the Russian-Ukrainian 
payment dispute in 2008/09. Bulgaria’s gas Russian supply comes 
from a single pipeline through Ukraine. For the first time in over 
35 years, service stopped completely. The country was cut off and 
left in the cold (Stefanov & Tsanov, 2012, p. 83). Industry and 
district heating companies suffered. Together with the economic 
crisis, the conflict led to a 20 percent drop in gas consumption in 
2009, according to BulgarGaz (Georgiev, 2010).  
After this experience, Bulgaria started to debate diversification 
and more independence from the Russian gas supply. A new en-
ergy strategy was forming. Increasing domestic production came 
into view as an option. This coincided with the growing interna-
tional interest in unconventional gas reserves in Europe, especially 
Eastern and Central Europe. The U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration (2013) estimates Bulgaria may have 481 billion cubic me-
tres of recoverable shale gas reserves.  
BulgarGaz, the domestic state-owned gas company, was not 
keen on exploring opportunities and probably lacked expertise and 
resources to do so. But by 2009/10, several foreign companies, 
mainly from the U.S. and Canada, expressed their interest in and 
applied for exploration licences to search for shale gas in Bul-
garia’s North. In response to the foreign investors’ prodding, the 
centre-right government, led by the GERB party (Citizens for Eu-
ropean Development of Bulgaria), opened the licensing process.  
The energy ministry quickly prepared a series of tenders to auc-
tion off shale gas exploration concessions. Among the firms gain-
ing permits in 2010/11 were Chevron (USA), Transatlantic Petro-
leum/Direct Petroleum Exploration (USA), Park Place Energy 
(Canada) (NGE, 2010). BNK Petroleum (USA) and Integrity 
Towers (USA) also expressed strong interest. In May 2011, in a 
rather spectacular and well-publicized move, Chevron outbid 
BNK Petroleum, offering the government “a whopping offer” of 
€30 million for a five-year concession – the state had actually only 
asked for a minimum price of €200,000 (Novinite.com, 2011b).  
Energy minister Traicho Traikov gleed over the deal, and an-
nounced that Bulgaria's estimated shale gas deposits – now the 
talks was one trillion cubic metres – should be able to guarantee 
domestic consumption of natural gas for the next several hundred 
years (Novinite.com, 2011b). Traikov stressed that the “use of 
one's own resources has a potential that not a single country can 
allow to neglect. Because it gives security, independence and 
lower consumer prices.” He stated, “if we get to industrial produc-
tion, we will be getting tens of millions in concession fees a year” 
(NGE, 2011a). The government’s rhetoric was excessively posi-
tive. That would prove to be a mistake with the distrustful public. 
Protests, elections, and “hysteria” 
Not everybody shared the government’s enthusiasm. One prob-
lem lay in the fact that, since Bulgaria does not have a large oil 
and gas producing sector and the projects were all new, no specific 
legislation for unconventional gas was in place; only general laws 
for mining, environmental, soil and water protection provide rules 
for licensing and extraction (Kassabov, 2010a). The government 
did not deal much with the specific risk issues connected to hy-
draulic fracturing. Public concerns about environmental and health 
damage arose and intensified quickly when environmental groups 
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began to campaign. A protest movement emerged quite fast, sur-
prising in a country with a rather weakly organized civil society.  
By July 2011, energy minister Traicho Traikov reacted by em-
phasizing that environmental concerns would be addressed by 
strict monitoring. But, he insisted, shale gas drilling would not be 
riskier than other mining (NGE, 2011a). Rising criticism began to 
make the government nervous. Political pressure grew and multi-
plied in the run-up to the October 2011 presidential election sea-
son. Opposition parties and candidates used the shale gas issue to 
position themselves against the government. Their message was: 
the government was out of sync with the people. In particular, the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) moved the gas issue to the highly 
symbolic centre of its campaign. Socialist presidential candidate 
Ivaylo Kalfin demonstratively called for a national referendum to 
stop shale gas exploration (3e, 2011a). Energy minister Traikov 
said “a hysteria is being whipped up” (3e, 2011b). 
In this overheated, polarized atmosphere, complex energy and 
environmental policy questions were reduced to partisan ammuni-
tion. Prime Minister and GERB party leader Boyko Borisov fueled 
hostility when he quipped at a local event that he would sign off 
shale gas permissions unless protestors stopped “nagging him:”  
Nothing will happen if you stop irritating me. About those holding 
the signs, I wish to tell that they are enticed by a particular political 
party. If this keeps going on, we will sign the contract just out of 
sheer stubbornness. (NGE, 2011b).  
This did not show prudence nor precautionary responsibility. It 
mirrored the government’s incapacity to engage in any sustained 
information or persuasion effort to solidify shale support in public 
opinion. This stood in stark contrast to the opposition campaign, 
which provided a large quantity of negative communication on 
shale gas, exploiting the public’s lack of balanced information. 
Anti-fracking material from foreign sources were spread, includ-
ing the controversial U.S. film “Gasland.” Film versions with Bul-
garian subtitles were available on video sharing websites since 
mid-2011 (Wood, 2013, p. 2).  Daborowski (2012), of the Polish 
OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, noted that anti-shale demonstra-
tions were not large-scale events but they “were perfectly organ-
ised, coordinated and publicised in the media.” The high water-
mark came in mid-January 2012, when thousands of protesters 
marched in eleven cities to demand a moratorium on exploration 
and statutory ban of the fracking method. Days later, the Borisov 
government and his GERB party totally shifted course, claiming 
that they could not act against the will of the people.  
The cabinet decided to enact an indefinite ban on hydraulic frac-
turing. Licences were amended so only conventional methods 
could be used. The ban went into effect immediately and indefi-
nitely. Companies that already had received permits were given 
three months to prove no fracking was involved. Offenders were 
threatened with a 100 million lev (€50 million) fine. Further ex-
ploration tenders were cancelled. U.S. investor Chevron found its 
expensive exploration permit for the Novi Pazar area revoked for 
allegedly insufficient evidence of environmental safety. (Konstan-
tinova & Carroll, 2012; Novinite.com, 2012a; Sofia Echo, 2012).  
The parliament voted overwhelmingly for the ban: Most of the 
opposition went along with the government’s and GERB party’s 
proposal. The parliament had not had any major debate on shale 
gas, and it did not commission any scientific study before the vote 
(Assenova, 2012a). Only months later did the parliament, on re-
quest of the government, install a special committee to study shale 
gas issues in general and review certain technical issues that they 
had voted upon earlier (Ivanova, 2013). Notably, the parliament 
did not pass a statutory law but a simple resolution (“reshenie”), 
which theoretically could be removed quickly (Daborowski & 
Groszkowski, 2012, p. 9). For energy minister and shale enthusiast 
Traikov, developments were a personal defeat. He admitted that 
the government had been unable to prevent extreme polarization, 
and that he personally had underestimated “the level of hysteria 
that occurred.” He regretted that further research on Bulgaria’s de-
posits was now impracticable: “I definitely would like to know 
how much natural gas resources we have, but in these conditions 
we cannot do it” (Novinite.com, 2012c).  
All decisions can be seen to be of purely political motives. The 
government’s U-turn sent out a message to foreign investors that 
companies cannot take any government authorisation, once given, 
for granted: business faces high political risks in Bulgaria. In ef-
fect, Bulgaria has an unlimited political moratorium on shale gas 
exploration with a concrete ban of hydraulic fracturing, which is 
why we will subsequently call it a ban rather than a moratorium.  
Why environmental opposition flared 
In a remarkably short period of time, Bulgaria’s society had be-
come very sensitive about the hydraulic fracturing method. The 
reasons were those well known in international debate: assumed 
risks of ground and drinking water pollution by chemicals, seis-
micity (“earthquakes”), unwanted industrialisation and disruption 
of country life, damage or destruction of roads and farmlands. 
From the environmentalists’ point of view, the consequences of 
contamination could be irreversibly damaging and catastrophic.  
 
Figure 1. Bulgarian anti-fracking protests ahead of the morato-
rium, July 2011 to January 2012, as accounted for by Control-
Risks, a global consulting firm (Wood, 2013, p. 7). 
 
In particular, Bulgarians became more united in their opposition 
because the exploration area in the Northeast is the country’s most 
fertile agricultural land: The region (“the granary of Bulgaria”) 
produces a very large share of wheat and other farming crops and 
contributes greatly to exports. Bulgaria is, like Romania, predom-
inantly rural. Bulgarian agriculture holds 19 percent (Romania's 
even 31 percent) of total employment, compared to the EU-28's 
average of five percent (European Commission, 2014a, 2014b).  
Farming communities fear water and ground contamination – 
and industrial development by (foreign) energy investors as a 
threat to their overall livelihood, not just as a general environmen-
tal concern. Legislative and regulatory frameworks were seen as 
inadequate, full of gaps, and unclear in regard to the fracking 
method. Among the deficits was the fact that extraction laws do 
not give public stakeholders specific rights to get information, file 
requests and complaints, or legally challenge decisions. Most en-
vironmental restrictions were at the government’s discretion. Lim-
ited legal means combine with generally low trust in due process 
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of law and the judicial system. Moreover, Bulgarian law does not 
give a landowner rights to sub-surface mineral resources. The state 
is the exclusive owner of natural resources and thus can grant con-
cessions without giving the public, the communities, and the land-
owners a say in the permit process. Questions of transparency and 
participation in decision-making mobilized people quickly. In par-
ticular, they felt politicians had been involved in secretive back-
stage agreements with foreign companies. In a country burdened 
with corruption, graft and political scandals, people assumed the 
worst. They found everything related to the issue of concessions 
to foreign companies very opaque. The response was negative. 
At the same time, Bulgaria’s established domestic energy sector 
was less than enthusiastic about the promise of energy supply al-
ternatives and the entry of foreign companies. Both the nuclear 
and the renewable energy industry have vested interests in the sta-
tus quo. The gas industry seemed more devoted to gas pipeline 
projects, whether South Stream (Gazprom) or its rival for non-
Russian gas imports from Azerbaijan, the Nabucco project. The 
general business community also showed no excitement. 
Symbolic fight: Bulgaria between East and West 
Most investors competing for Bulgarian shale gas concessions 
were American companies. Chevron was the most prominent, and 
it received open and prominent help from the U.S. government. 
Remarkably, in summer 2010 U.S. ambassador James Warlick en-
gaged very publicly at events and in the news media for Chevron’s 
interests, whose managers were allowed to present their plans di-
rectly to prime minister Boyko Borisov and other high-ranking of-
ficials (Novinite.com, 2010). In interviews to newspapers and on 
TV, Warlick continued to advertise the economic benefits of shale 
gas and the promise of investment and jobs creation by U.S. firms 
such as Chevron, trying to create a more positive opinion climate.   
At the height of public protests, Warlick warned in media inter-
views that Bulgaria should think twice whether it really wanted to 
chase Chevron away (Novinite.com, 2012; Konstantinova & Car-
roll, 2012). When the parliament had voted on the ban, Warlick 
stated in an op-ed that this would “have a profoundly negative ef-
fect on the future of its energy supply, investment climate, and 
economy.” He criticized that “a full, informed, and public debate” 
weighing relative risks, cost and environmental impacts of energy 
sources should have taken place, but did not. The country had a 
“vacuum of information” about the pros and cons. He also said 
that “certain groups have a vested interest in maintaining depend-
ence on costly imported energy” (Warlick, 2012). He reiterated 
these arguments in many media appearances. 
From 2010, the U.S. ambassador showed such active and even 
pushy participation in Bulgaria’s internal debate that he came to 
look like the father of U.S. firms’ interest in the country. Energy 
minister Traikov felt in late 2010 he had to reprimand the diplomat 
publicly for complaining that Chevron had not yet received a per-
mit. Traikov also claimed it was he, not Warlick, who brought the 
company in: “Why did Chevron come at all? Because when I vis-
ited the US, I went and talked with them, even though the US em-
bassy had told me, don't talk to them, they are a huge company and 
are not interested in Bulgaria” (Novinite.com, 2010b). 
Warlick’s activity received mixed echoes, all the more because 
Warlick’s interventions looked like Washington pressure serving 
corporate interests. For example, Kassabov (2012), in an editorial 
for Novinite.com, called Warlick’s interventions “undiplomatic 
behaviour.” He described the U.S. ambassador’s actions a “con-
sistent campaign of pushing Chevron in the center of public atten-
tion” and “staunch preaching of the company's interests – at times 
patronizing and disrespectful of the very laws in Bulgaria.” 
Kassabov opined that a new dependence on U.S. firms like Chev-
ron would be no better than one on Gazprom. Bulgaria could still 
be “ruined” by foreign corporate and geostrategic interests.  
The impression that Washington was putting Bulgaria’s govern-
ment under heavy pressure was strengthened when U.S. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton visited Bulgaria in early 2012. It was per-
ceived that Clinton was “lobbying” for Chevron’s interests and for 
Bulgaria’s break with Russian dependence (Euractiv, 2012b; 
Kassabov, 2012). Clinton also sent “energy tsar” Richard Morn-
ingstar, U.S. special envoy for Eurasian energy, on a mission to 
Sofia for talks with policy-makers “about how we can be more 
helpful in protecting your environment and advancing your energy 
security goals” (Euractiv, 2012b; UPI, 2013).  
Those friendly to U.S. investment were quick to suggest that 
protests were orchestrated by Russian interests. On TV, energy 
minister Traikov opined that a well-financed large-scale PR cam-
paign was behind the anti-fracking campaign – obviously hinting 
at Russian gas monopolist Gazprom. “A motivated elite” had mis-
led people. “Those who protested and those who negotiated with 
us were fully aware of it,” he said. In order to explain the move-
ment, one should look “in the direction of money” and “who is to 
benefit and who is to lose” (Novinite.com, 2012c). In February 
2012, a “Movement for Energy Independence” (DEN) was initi-
ated by experts who insisted that Gazprom had manipulated Bul-
garia into imposing the shale gas ban (Novinite.com, 2012d).  
One of the founders, Ivan Sotirov, who is linked with the centre-
right Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), published an interna-
tionally spread editorial in the Trud newspaper. Under the head-
line, “Russian Lobby Against Shale Gas,” he called the “pseudo-
civic pressure” a disinformation campaign “built on cheap manip-
ulations and lies” and “an attempt to masquerade a political issue 
as purely ecological.” He felt reminded of Cold War era Com-
munist- organized “awful anti-American and anti-imperialist 
events.” He went on to expose opponents as people linked to a 
domestic “energy mafia” (meaning state-owned BulgarGaz and 
the strong nuclear lobby) as well as Russia and Gazprom’s South 
Stream pipeline project, concluding that  
after 22 years of democracy Bulgaria's politics continues to be dic-
tated by pro-Russian oligarchic circles. Hiding behind nationalistic 
and ecological rhetoric, they have prevented entry of any single seri-
ous strategic Western investor. The question is how long it takes until 
somebody will finally stop them. (Sotirov, 2012, author’s transl.). 
For many, the issue became framed as a question of whether 
Bulgaria wanted to side with the U.S. or continue its traditional 
ties with Russia. Political elites, parties and civil organisations 
split along the lines of pro-Western or pro-Eastern camps. Envi-
ronmentalism became linked with anti-American and anti-big-
business positions. In one insightful commentary, TV journalist 
Boyko Vassilev analysed:  
The battle wasn’t really about shale gas itself. Gas – indeed, energy 
as a whole – has long [been] a stand-in for the oldest Bulgarian na-
tional question: Russia or the West? […]  
Same old battle, the one Bulgarians have repeated for 130 years. Pro-
Russian and pro-Western arguments are dressed in different clothes 
to apply to every national issue, ancient or modern. Instead of paying 
attention to each other’s environmental or economic points, the fight 
becomes Gazprom vs. Chevron, Russian lobbyists vs. American lob-
byists. Nobody wanted to exchange, let alone change, views; people 
simply did not listen to anything that displeased them. It seemed less 
a policy debate than a matter of religious belief.  
In all that fuss, few bothered to ask the geologists. They had some 
smart things to say on both sides, but their insights were met with 
battle cries. “Weren’t you a consultant for Texaco?” “Why should 
we listen to someone who was educated in Moscow?” Amusingly, 
both sides complained that the public was being shielded from their 
arguments and only their opponents were being heard.  
Ultimately the anti camp prevailed, with the help of two mighty 
forces that champion online campaigning and are increasingly im-
portant in Bulgaria: environmental activists and anti-globalists. The 
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former, who make up a sizable and intelligent chunk of urban youth, 
added shale gas to their many causes almost automatically. For anti-
globalists it was just another reason to denounce big politics (the 
United States) and big business (Chevron). (Vassilev, 2012) 
Thus, the shale gas question and foreign investor engagement 
was absorbed as a symbolic issue by both traditional political in-
terests and a new, broader coalition of socially mobilized groups. 
The shale gas issue did not stand on its own but was enmeshed in 
much larger controversies about the country’s politics and future. 
Communication failure 
A puzzle about the hot debate remains. Politicians and NGOs 
battled it out, with a number of experts on both sides, the nuclear 
industry (negative on shale), and U.S. government officials taking 
part. But neither was there an effective public relations effort by 
the government, nor was there much of a longer parliamentary de-
bate, nor communicative outreach by the firms which had come in 
to drill. A constructive direct dialogue between companies and the 
public, the environmentalists or local community organisations 
could not be observed. While Chevron was pushed in the limelight 
and continuously attacked offline and online, it only issued a few 
lame press statements and did not open 
dedicated online channels until 2012 (see 
illustrations). “What was striking,” the 
Polish think tank OSW noted, “was the fact 
that the public debate was not joined by 
representatives of the companies which had 
been engaged in prospecting for shale gas 
in Bulgaria” (Daborowski & Groszkowski, 
2012, p. 10). Lack of quality information, dialogue and trust-build-
ing efforts for a more balanced debate made it easy for simple slo-
gans to dominate the debate. It is plausible that the public then 
quickly turns negative on projects – particularly in a country where 
environmental laws and regulations are often honoured in the 
breach, no public consultation culture exists, and people are al-
ways ready to suspect corruption in any major deal between busi-
ness and government.  
Under scrutiny, these domestic dynamics look more influential 
than spooky geopolitical proposals that a new Cold War is raging 
and that Moscow is secretly steering protest movements. Shaffer 
(2014) offers that Gazprom uses “insidious” tactics; it supports 
“bogus environmental movements” and has “funded anti-fracking 
campaigns in Europe, including in Ukraine and Bulgaria, to slow 
Europe’s development of local gas supplies.”   
U.S. energy expert Aviezer Tucker also holds “the mark of out-
side influence is clear: In Bulgaria, there are rarely demonstrations 
of any kind” (2012b), assuming that Bulgarian civil society protest 
could not have risen quickly and effectively without external guid-
ance, media power, money and logistics. He interprets rising en-
vironmentalism as a Russian-controlled “mobilizing ideology.” 
Gazprom, he proposes, knows the languages, cultures and politi-
cians in Southeastern Europe, and knows 
how to play, rather than ignore, the emer-
gent civil society. “Doing business exclu-
sively with the politicians and ignoring 
civil society is a mistake Gazprom has not 
made,” claims Tucker (2012a), and shale 
supporters and foreign investors woke up 
too late as “public perception already had 
been dominated by myths and misconcep-
tions about hydraulic fracturing, courtesy 
of Russian-financed public-relations 
firms” (Tucker, 2012a).  
It can be confirmed that public percep-
tion was framed negatively in the absence 
of counterbalancing pro-shale communica-
tion, but whether that happened “courtesy 
of” Russian influence is far more question-
able and without real evidence. Rather, 
Bulgarian NGOs and green politicians evi-
dently used and spread information from 
other international sources, particularly 
other European and American anti-frack-
ing organisations and media. 
Where such voices are probably right is 
that investors, particularly U.S. companies, 
have been blind to strategy adjustment in 
order to establish trust and win a social li-
cence. Perhaps that is due to a “terrible pro-
vincialism” among U.S. corporations, who, 
according to Tucker, send executives 
into a country they basically do not under-
stand.  They then conduct business through 
intermediaries, fixers, shady people who 
know somebody in the power structure.  Then 
money changes hands much like it would be 
in authoritarian countries in the Middle East, 
and the corporations expect to start drilling 
and concentrate on technical problems under 
the ground. Then, suddenly, out of the blue, 
the corporations make this startling discov-
ery: They are operating in Europe and not the 
Middle East. Some of the politicians may be 
corrupt, but they still need to win largely fair 
democratic elections.  There is civil society 
and there is free media that does its job ex-
posing corruption and criticizing government 
Figure 2. As Chevron practically has no 
other operational interests in Bulgaria 
other than shale gas, its country website 
www.chevron.bg is exclusively devoted to 
the subject of unconventional resources.  
On its Twitter channel ChevronBulgaria, 
the firm tweets almost daily – though not 
with Bulgarian news but rather information 
on Romania’s or other international devel-
opments on shale gas. The channel’s first 
tweet went online in October 2012. 
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decisions. […] Had the corporations spent half a minute realizing 
where they were, they could have hired area experts who know the 
languages and the histories and some credible locals with patriotic 
credentials, not the shady intermediary types and try to explain to 
society and the media what and why they are doing what they are 
doing and what are the potential advantages to society and the poli-
ticians for whom people vote. 
There is this false universalist mentality that the world can be run by 
MBAs and engineers who have universal models that can apply eve-
rywhere and so they do not need to know anything about local con-
ditions and can ignore civil society. This is nonsense that costs 
money. […] [T]he cause of energy independence will need to be ad-
vanced by local political and social movements and by diplomats 
who do know languages and study foreign cultures.  (Sahraoui, 2012) 
Indeed, at ground level, there was no attempt to build a pro-shale 
coalition with social credibility, and diplomatic interventions from 
the U.S. seemed to hurt rather than help the cause in Bulgaria. 
Will Bulgaria’s ban stay?  
After the May 2013 parliamentary elections, the Bulgarian So-
cialist Party (BSP) formed a governing coalition with the liberal 
Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS). In 2011/12, both par-
ties had positioned themselves opposing shale gas. Given the po-
larized issue climate, it is unlikely that a lifting of the ban comes 
in the near future – unless the governing parties reverse course like 
the GERB party did in early 2012.  
This does not seem to have practical energy policy value. While 
relations with Russia became strained during the Ukraine and Cri-
mea crisis, the traditionally Russia-friendly BSP cannot but con-
tinue to concentrate on working with gas supply contracts with 
Gazprom and the South Stream pipeline construction project. 
Moreover, the incoming government immediately faced street pro-
tests on a variety of issues, including energy policies. 
Upon taking office, prime minister Plamen Oresharski (BSP) 
said a review of the shale gas moratorium was not among his cab-
inet’s priorities, but: “Of course, life is dynamic, and, where ap-
propriate, will include new priorities and changing others” 
(24chasa, 2013). Was he testing the waters for a policy reversal? 
Incoming environment minister Iskra Mihaylova (DPS) ques-
tioned the effectiveness of the ban. She commented in a TV inter-
view that the ban was a temporary measure but not a final answer 
to the question of whether shale gas production could be possible 
and under what conditions. The ban was triggered by public mis-
trust of Bulgarian and EU laws, Mihaylova stated, and this public 
mistrust is the main problem. Environmental legislation, by con-
trast, in her view is good and strict enough to allow for preliminary 
studies of shale gas and guarantee safety. The country could afford 
to launch research to identify shale gas options and potential eco-
logical and health risks – after gaining this information, the people 
would be free to say no to concrete projects, instead of an all-out 
flat no (Sega, 2013; Novinite.com, 2013).  
Mihaylova’s comments caused an uproar among fracking crit-
ics. Days later, she retracted and made clear that the ban would 
stay as long as citizens wanted it. She would obey, since citizens 
had made her minister. The cabinet did not plan to propose a re-
peal. She explained she had only shared “thoughts” she had devel-
oped while serving on a parliamentary committee (Ivanova, 2013). 
Shale gas, for the near future, does not seem to be on the politi-
cal agenda. The government focuses on a variety of difficult other 
energy policy projects – curbing end-user prices, working on the 
South Stream and potential other gas pipelines, efficiency and re-
newable energy matters. One key factor for future development in 
Bulgaria may be what happens in neighbouring Romania, which 
has exited from a 2012 moratorium and is now actively supporting 
shale gas exploration. Bulgarian anti-fracking activists are closely 
monitoring this and protest against operations at the borders. 
Romania: Exit from a Moratorium  
Romania’s energy sources are fairly diverse – from coal, oil and 
gas to nuclear (two reactors), hydropower and wind. Because it 
has substantial domestic gas and oil supply and a tradition of 150 
years of an oil and petrochemical industry, Romania’s import sit-
uation is very different from Bulgaria’s.  
Gas imports are almost completely Russian, but gas imports 
make for only 17 percent of Romanian gas consumption (SGE, 
2013a). The lion’s share is locally sourced. At the moment, natural 
gas is the country’s most important energy resource, accounting 
for over 30 percent of all energy resources used in Romania (Dab-
orowski & Groszkowski, 2012, p. 22). The country is the largest 
gas producer in Central Europe; the problem lies in continuous and 
fast decline of reserves, expected to run out in the next 15-20 years 
(SGE, 2013b). High gas prices add to the challenge.  
The country is therefore heavily involved in the gas pipeline 
politics of the region and links to Asia, just like Bulgaria. It is con-
sidering its options to avoid an ever-increasing reliance on Russian 
gas imports. 
Discovery of substantial unconventional gas deposits has 
opened a prospect of regaining domestic production strength and 
economic growth fuelled by cheaper energy, in turn making Ro-
mania attractive to foreign investors. Interestingly, some potential 
had been known to state-owned gas producer Romgaz. Romgaz  
communicated in 2012 that it had successfully tested fields in 
Transylvania in the mid-1990s, using hydraulic fracturing tech-
niques with U.S. know-how (Pirvoiu, 2012). 
According to a 2013 study by the European Centre for Excel-
lence in the Field of Natural Gas (Centgas) as a part of the Roma-
nian National Committee of the World Energy Council, Roma-
nia’s unconventional gas resources could present an alternative for 
the future energy mix. It could improve Romania’s energy self-
reliance, even leading to independence. The country’s gas exports 
could contribute 1.5 percent to annual GDP. Gas prices could de-
crease by over 30 percent in the long term. Production could create 
many jobs and much tax income (SGE, 2013b).  
The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated in 2012 
that Romanian’s ground contained 1.4 billion cubic meters of tech-
nically recoverable resources. If true, Romania has the third-larg-
est deposit in Europe behind France and Poland. Several areas in 
Romania seem to have good potential to develop unconventional 
gas: the Oriental Carpathian Mountains, the Moesian Platform, 
Southern Dobruja, and the Bârlad Depression (SGE, 2013b).  
Despite many uncertainties, these potentially large deposits 
have drawn international investors. One of the most interested 
companies is American supermajor Chevron. It obtained four pro-
specting licences, three in Dobroesti in 2010 (close to the Bulgar-
ian border) and one in the Barlad region in 2011 (Daborowski & 
Groszkowski, 2012, p. 24). Among Chevron’s potential rivals are 
Romania’s two largest gas producers, state-owned Romgaz and 
privatized oil corporation Petrom, now owned by Austrian OMV, 
also plans to enter the game (Marinas & Patran, 2013). Hungary's 
MOL, Canada’s East West Petroleum (EWP) and other firms also 
showed interest.  
Communication failure  
The new subject unleashed political controversies with many 
similarities to Bulgaria. In fact, what happened in Romania can be 
interpreted as a spillover from Bulgaria’s events. Until the end of 
2011, Romania’s centre-right government of prime minister Mihai 
Razvan Ungureanu took a supportive position toward the explora-
tion and potential production of shale gas. Like Bulgaria’s, the Ro-
manian government handed out exploration licences without much 
publicity.  
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Government public communication about shale gas benefits and 
risks was essentially nil. This failure to proactively discuss pros 
and cons, and a too-late, reactive attempt to explain decisions only 
after protests and intense negative media coverage had reached a 
peak, went on to wreak havoc on the government. It met already 
high social discontent over other issues, especially the state’s aus-
terity policy, budget cuts and tax increases. The shale gas issue 
entered discourse quite suddenly. Before 2011, the issue was prac-
tically not on the country’s public radar screen. With the public’s 
“complete informational blackout”, the shale gas issue had “an un-
fortunate debut” and became subject to “political footballery” 
(Gusilov, 2012, p. 5-6).  
The government’s licensing practice without communication 
brought about massive citizen protests. Political instability seemed 
big enough for U.S. investor Chevron to declare in April 2012, 
only days after its concession agreement went into force, that it 
would not have drilling operations but only seismic data surveys 
in the next 12 months (which of course is the natural process any-
way). Country manager Tom Holst stated:  
We  recognize  the  importance  of  sharing  facts  on  the  exploration  
technologies,  that are  standard  for  oil  and  natural  gas,  and  ex-
ploitation  technologies  for  releasing  natural  gas  from  shale for-
mations,  which  are  new  to  Romania,  but  have  been  safely  used  
for  decades  in  many  locations. In  the  months  ahead,  Chevron  is  
committed  to focus  on  creating  a  dialog  with  the  population  and  
policymakers,  in  order  to  clarify both  the  concerns  as  well  as  
many  benefits associated  with  this clean  and  efficient  energy  
source. (Chevron, 2012) 
That same month, the government collapsed over a parliamen-
tary no-confidence vote introduced by opposition Social Demo-
crats. They accused the government of authorising shale gas ex-
ploration without adequate scientific and regulatory oversight 
(BBC, 2012a; Economist, 2012). The Social Democrats took over, 
forming Romania’s third cabinet in this year. In May, the new gov-
ernment under prime minister Victor Ponta imposed an adminis-
trative six-month moratorium on the exploration and exploitation 
of shale gas. Officially, the government declared it was waiting for 
EU studies on environmental risks to be concluded. The morato-
rium expired by end of 2012. It was not renewed.  
In January 2013, U.S. energy firm Chevron obtained permission 
to go forward with shale gas exploration. Local authorities had no 
option but to grant permits once the moratorium had expired. By 
March 2013, the government had made a full U-turn and came out 
in support of shale gas. Politically, it was a broken promise.  
This led to even more protests, which the government decided 
to face down and even suppress by sending riot police to local hot 
spots, including Chevron locations. Meanwhile, Chevron began 
on-site village meetings to present and discuss plans with local 
residents. Nationally, it said in media statements that it “respects 
the freedom of expression and individual liberties” and that   
Chevron understands that communities have expectations and con-
cerns surrounding the development of natural gas from shale, and the 
company will continue to address these through frequent consulta-
tions with local stakeholders, and by respectfully addressing them 
through open and honest dialogue. (Molnar, 2013a) 
The Ponta government took a gamble with public opinion. A 
Eurobarometer survey reported in January 2013 (based on autumn 
2012) very low support for prioritising shale gas efforts, while a 
majority of respondents expressed concern should a shale gas pro-
ject start in their neighbourhood. Clearly lower percentages than 
the EU-27 average, also lower than in Bulgaria, agreed that Euro-
pean rather than national approaches should prevail (see Table 1).  
A Romanian April 2013 poll reported that shale gas was seen as 
a threat by a plurality of Romanians. The survey found 42 percent 
believed shale gas drilling poses a danger to the environment and 
people, while 22 percent did not. 16 percent said they could not 
judge and comment upon dangers. Finally, 20 percent of respond-
ents said they had not yet heard of the issue, the ARP polling firm 
reported (2013, p. 34).  
Visan (2013) ), of the Romanian Energy Center, comments that 
public opinion has no real profile because the subject is a novelty. 
Most citizens lack substantial information. Where public opinion 
is or will go is not clear. This stands in contrast to a political elite 
where, Visan suggests, currently an apparent consensus exists on 
the economic and strategic benefits of shale gas. He concludes: 
“The state and civil society are not on the same page” (p. 9).  
 
Table 1. Eurobarometer (2013) public opinion poll 
 
Q21. Thinking about the next 30 years, which of the following en-



























































































Romania 49% 21% 16% 21% 9% 10% 
Bulgaria 45% 29% 28% 10% 8% 7% 
EU 27 70% 28% 18% 12% 9% 8% 
 
Q22. If a shale gas project were to be located in your neighbour-
hood, do you think that you would be…  










Romania 42% 31% 14% 7% 6% 
Bulgaria 50% 28% 10% 8% 4% 
EU 27 40% 34% 13% 7% 6% 
 
Q23. Do you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally 
disagree with the wollowing statement: Harmonised and consistent 
approaches should be developed in the EU to manage unconven-











Romania 24% 26% 11% 29% 10% 
Bulgaria 19% 38% 13% 23% 7% 
EU 27 28% 33% 13% 17% 9% 
 
Field research conducted in September 2012 in Bulgaria by TNS BBSS (1003 adults 15+ 
yrs) and in Romania by TNS CSOP (1002 adults). Polled in the EU27: 25,525 adults. 
 
Meanwhile, the Romanian government slowly began to recon-
sider its poor communication strategy. In April 2013, the National 
Agency for Mineral Resources (NAMR) began a year-long infor-
mation effort on shale gas, a pilot project campaign half funded by 
the EU. Notably, the overall budget was a meagre €121,000. The 
NAMR explains that it aimed to inform “in a neutral way to ensure 
a balanced exchange of views.” The budget would mainly go into 
a website (www.infogazedesist.eu, launched in July 2013) and di-
verse publications, and online consultation, and the setup of two 
public hearings in January 2014, one for each region where activ-
ities on shale gas are planned (Barlad and Dobrogea/Constanta) to 
bring in various stakeholders: central and local public authorities, 
NGOs, the general public, experts, academia and the media. They 
were to generate a debate on online consultations’ findings, to 
“create the opportunity for the community to express certain con-
cerns,” and  “build confidence between people and authorities in 
charge with implementation of the projects.” The Agency put to-
gether a road show, brochures, flyers, press releases (Baciu, 2013).  
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If participation at the campaign website discussion forum is an 
indicator of success, then this success is absent. The ongoing 
online survey has only been used, as of this writing (April 2014), 
by 144 users. The question “Do you agree to start exploration to 
identify whether there is shale gas in Romania?” was answered by 
88 percent with “no.” The forum had only 178 members, with 45 
posts (Infogazedesist.eu, 2014). This is laughable in contrast to the 
broad online activity by protest groups and media coverage of anti-
fracking protest action during the NAMR campaign’s period. 
 
 
   
Figure 3. The EU-co-funded government “Campaign for infor-
mation and public debate”: An NAMR flyer and the website 
www.infogazedesist.eu. Flyers were distributed to households in 
shale gas exploration areas in September 2013 (Baciu, 2013). 
 
The Agency had a plausible rationale: People expect and de-
mand authorities to fill the information gap. NAMR reasoned that  
in Romania, the general opinion upon shale gas issue is characterized 
by scepticism and suspicion, mainly, because is not sufficiently ex-
plained and the local population and local authorities lack balanced 
information in terms of opportunities and threats related to shale gas 
exploration and exploitation (Baciu, 2013). 
The Agency reported findings of July 2013 representative local 
public opinion surveys and focus groups. Over 60 percent of re-
spondents said they felt poorly informed about unconventional re-
sources, the difference between exploration and exploitation, ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Over 40 percent believed that initial 
works were about production, not exploration. Over 50 percent 
said they did not know how long exploration takes (3-5 years). 
Over 65 percent said they did not know about potential risks dur-
ing exploration, and over 50 percent said the same about disad-
vantages of the later exploitation phase. Over 40 percent could not 
name advantages of shale gas. 47 percent stated that there had been 
no accurate public information. About half believed that it was 
mainly the local authorities’s duty to inform citizens; others ex-
pected it from various national government offices (Baciu, 2013).  
The Agency’s campaign is, however, hardly “neutral” as it 
claims. Its “key messages” clearly aim at “mobilising support” and 
include a range of pro-shale advocacy arguments, i.e. that the pro-
jects will generate local revenues, contracts for local firms, em-
ployment, better infrastructure, or plainly, “Romania will no 
longer be dependent on the Russian gas” (Baciu, 2013). 
Mr. Ponta’s U-turn politics 
The reversal of the reversal of shale gas policy points, like in 
Bulgaria’s case, to the eminent political risk investors face in 
Southeast Europe. Romania has difficult and turbulent politics: Its 
party system and coalition governments tend to be instable. Alli-
ances form and break. The year 2012 saw two governments col-
lapse, and the end-of-year election totally shifted party strengths. 
Election turnout is as low as public trust in political institutions 
and leaders, and citizen dissatisfaction is high. Constant elite 
power struggles in 2012 even led to a constitutional crisis. The 
public is very aware of widespread corruption. Romania is, as its 
neighbour Bulgaria, under special EU monitoring based on con-
cerns about corruption, due legal process, judicial independence 
and implementing promised reforms.  
A key factor in politics has been public anger at the austerity 
policies required by international aid to Romania during the finan-
cial and economic crisis in 2009. Cutting the budget, public ser-
vices and civil servants’ salaries, as well as tax increases, were so 
unpopular and resulting in partly violent protests that prime min-
ister Emil Boc resigned in February 2012. His successor Mihai 
Răzvan Ungureanu lasted only two months. In summer 2012 local 
elections and then the December 2012 general elections, Social 
Democrat Victor Ponta was able to profit from the turbulences, 
winning with his centre-left Social Liberal Union an absolute ma-
jority of nearly 60 percent, crushing other parties (BBC, 2012b). 
It is in this context that energy policy-making of the current gov-
ernment and the ongoing public controversies must be seen. Local 
protests against fracking had begun in early 2012 and merged with 
anti-government protests of a general nature. The shale gas con-
troversy won public attention through linking with other protest 
and civil unrest – against the backdrop of a hot election year.  
“In an intense political rivalry,” notes Huseynov (2013), “none 
of the political forces wanted to take responsibility for the contro-
versial shale gas explorations and risk losing voters.” Ponta’s cen-
tre-left electoral alliance promised to revoke the concessions given 
to energy companies and quickly install a moratorium. This was 
popular and populist, and Ponta rode the green wave. Upon taking 
office, the government made good on the promise. Shale gas op-
ponents applauded. Environmentalist NGOs celebrated Ponta with 
a “Young Ecologists’ Hope” Green Award in summer 2012 
(Guvernul Romaniei, 2012).  
The NGOs should have looked twice at their green hero. Soon 
enough, the premier stated that Romania was to move along with 
EU neighbours: “We want to be neither the only country to accept 
shale gas tapping nor the only one to oppose it.” Over time, tech-
nology and ecological standards would evolve. Romania would 
take a stand once better knowledge was available (Euractiv, 2012).  
A legislative initiative from Ponta’s party to go further and pro-
hibit fracking by statute was halted by the government and the Ro-
manian Senate in June. It signalled that the new prime minister 
Victor Ponta wanted to leave his options open until after the au-
tumn elections (Euractiv, 2012). The moratorium, concludes 
Gusilov (2012), was thus likely to be based on a desire to cool 
down the political temperature before the upcoming December 
elections, and to buy time (p. 4-5). By the end of 2012, it was al-
ready expected that the Ponta government would shift course. In-
deed, it was preparing to do so. One clue: In October, the govern-
ment’s National Agency for Mineral Resources (NAMR) applied 
for EU funds for a shale gas information campaign in the two re-
gions where concessions had been given to start in spring 2013 
(Bacius, 2013). The year passed, and now Ponta stated he would 
support shale exploration -- pointing to energy prices as a factor 
for the economy’s competetiveness, Russian imports and energy 
independence as fundamental issues. He would assume responsi-
bility for this “unpopular” policy (Stroe, 2013).  
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Vişan (2013) explains the U-turn by two factors: political and 
economic. After the electoral season was over, the anti-shale gas 
position seemed untenable in both ways. The government now en-
joyed solid large parliamentary majorities without any need to ca-
ter to green party or NGO interests. It believed no large-scale pro-
test effort could be sustained for long. In addition, the government 
wanted to avoid conflicts with foreign investors, especially those 
from the U.S. like Chevron. A deep strategic partnership with 
Washington is key in Romania’s diplomacy, and the U.S. expects 
– and pushes for – a cooperative attitude toward U.S. firms. Eco-
nomically, Ponta’s government was “under pressure to deliver, 
given the hopes for better economic prospects” which its electoral 
supporters really want. In energy economics, it became clear in 
2012-13 that the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project would fail. 
Nabucco had held the promise of delivering non-Russian gas. Its 
failure meant that future imports can only come from Russia 
(Vişan, 2013, p. 6).   
This is not desirable for the Social Democrats. Their sister party 
in Bulgaria, BSP, may be friendly to Moscow, but the left in Ro-
mania keeps more distance and does not have BSP’s political, 
business and historical ties to Russia or Gazprom interests. In re-
spect to energy policy and Russia, the two Socialist parties in gov-
ernment have little in common (Assenova, 2013). 
Ponta’s about-face infuriated many of his electoral supporters. 
He seemed just like another politician who was breaking his word, 
letting down and betraying the people who had trusted him. Those 
who had been angry with Ponta’s predecessor government over 
licensing shale gas firms now were angry at him for returning to 
the out-voted coalition’s policy. This mobilized anti-fracking cam-
paigners who once again could couple with anti-elite sentiment.  
The campaign also resonates with a general scepticism about the 
legitimate role of business in society and natural resources use. As 
in Bulgaria, critical issues lie in the legal principles of natural re-
sources exploitation. Romania’s constitution lays down that min-
eral resources belong to the public domain, i.e. the state, not to 
landowners. This means the government gives permission rights 
to explore and extract to companies, while landowners cannot de-
cide what happens with their lands. This may incite Not-in-my-
back-yard (NIMBY) resistance. Private property owners have a 
right to compensation but cannot decline right-of-way and drilling 
operations. Operationally, this works under a normal mining re-
gime, not under a specific law for unconventional resources (Mun-
teanu-Jipescu, 2013).  
The essence of decision is national, not local. Conflicts between 
local and national public interest can and do arise, and they have 
been a key driver of confrontation. From a national view, uncon-
ventional gas operations could have large economic benefits for 
Romania. Locally, the (environmental) cost may outweigh bene-
fits. While there may be some visible benefits in construction and 
services near a drilling site, it is far more important that by law, 
royalties and taxes collected will be income for the state, not mu-
nicipalities. The question of a community dividend is wide open. 
Traits of the anti-shale gas protest movement 
Since 2012, Romania’s ongoing series of protest action and 
demonstrations against exploration of shale gas evolved from sin-
gle local events to a national scope. As elsewhere, the main issues 
are water and ground contamination and other environmental 
risks, as well as fears about earthquakes. Online and social media 
networking has been a catalyst, but the more visible part were 
street demonstrations. As in Bulgaria, Chevron came to be singled 
out as a target with anti-American overtones; but some activists 
also claimed they were “not fighting Chevron, they are fighting 
the government,” criticizing a “lack of transparency and infor-
mation” on planned exploration programs (Karasz, 2012).  
Perhaps rightly so. Groszkowski & Daborowski (2012) point 
out that it was the government, rather than Chevron, which 
“strangely maneuvered not to disclose its exploration licence 
agreement with Chevron, even though the American company 
suggested unveiling the document in order to stop the rumours of 
corruption and conspiracy theories.” Demonstrations involving 
tens of thousands of participants in dozens of locations across the 
nation were not just about environmental safeguarding but also 
very much about respecting the will of local communities and 
transparent decision making.  
In the past two years, regional centers have been the city of Bar-
lad and the Pungesti village in Eastern Romania where Chevron is 
operating. Protesters have used social media, Internet TV, and 
online petition campaigns, they have organized marches, human 
chains, roadblocks, and protest camps. While most protests are 
peaceful, some have turned into violent clashes with police, lead-
ing to arrests, injuries and complaints about police brutality. Some 
involve local political controversies where politicians and local 
party branches get engaged with both pro and anti-shale gas sides 
– playing local politics and competing for support (Vişan, 2013; 
Revolution News, 2012; Patran, 2013; AFP, 2013).  
In Pungesti, a tiny community but now internationally known 
because of TV coverage of the protests in autumn 2013, Chevron 
was forced to suspend operations for several months. After weeks 
of site blockings and riots, Chevron removed personnel and equip-
ment from the site. In November, in an unusual 45-minute video 
interview with HotNews.ro, Chevron country manager Tom Holst 
explained the firm’s efforts at length. This included meetings, pub-
lications about the technical process and voluntarily disclosure of 
frac-fluid composition. He emphasized the local approach: 
[W]e went door-to-door and talked to people face-to-face, we will 
continue to do it and we have sent delegations, there has been a trip 
to Poland so that they may talk to members of a community and see 
such operations with their own eyes, so that, coming back, they may 
tell the neighbours what they have seen. This is how we communi-
cate. […] [W]hat we found in the door-to-door campaign in August 
and September was very interesting. The teams visited four local 
communities, more than 600 households, and discussions took 20 to 
80 minutes. This is a good length of time for dialogue, for providing 
information. In only two of the 600 households people said “sorry, 
no, we have enough information”. What I can see in this is that peo-
ple want to understand and want to receive information. 
[…] [in Dobrogea] our method of communication was to go to the 
local mayors, we went to about 15 mayor’s offices in small commu-
nities, we had question and answer sessions and provided a presen-
tation. Today, for instance, in such a community, at the local mayor’s 
office, there will be a presentation, academics will come to speak 
about technology-related issues and there will be a Q&A session. 
This is how we believe we can best communicate to the people and 
our experience tells us that we will need those communities and will 
continue to focus our activity on those communities. (Pantazi, 2013) 
Holst stated Chevron wanted to be “a good neighbour, which 
means social investment.” This meant, for example, donating an 
ambulance to a hospital or a medical caravan visiting villages; 
sponsoring a programme to keep underprivileged youths in school; 
improving roads or drilling drinking water wells (Pantazi, 2013).  
What he did not say was that not always were the door-to-door 
visitors, publications or gifts welcomed. In many reported cases, 
Chevron contractors were threatened by mobs, chased away or 
could only conduct their work under heavy police protection; the 
“dialogue” became to look absurd. A British TV team reported:  
Stories abound of Chevron representatives attempting to hand out 
yoghurts and t-shirts on the village high street months earlier, crude 
acts of poorly-calculated PR that backfired spectacularly, yoghurts 
thrown back in disgust at the people distributing them. (Wickens & 
O'Brien, 2014) 
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Local defiance in the remote rural areas does not look like the 
green activism in the protest camp at University Square in Bucha-
rest. In the poorest corner of Europe, incoming engineers and their 
high-tech fleets engage in a culture clash. Subsistence farmers and 
conservative villagers are “the unlikeliest of eco-protesters, a life-
time of hardship engraved on their faces” (Wickens & O'Brien, 
2014). They would rather stay poor, live off their little land, social 
aid and cash from relatives working abroad than to compromise 
water and fields. They want to be left alone and stubbornly resist 
Chevron’s “conversation grounded in scientific data” (Ilie, 2012). 
In April 2014, Chevron resumed activity and began to build its 
first drilling rigs, again met by demonstrators and blockades 
(Novinite.com, 2014). The same month, cross-country protests 
culminated in a “Ziua Naţională de Proteste anti-fracking,” or Na-
tional Day of Protest Against Fracking, in 60 cities, with 150 
NGOs and local groups participating. Most local action gathered 
only hundreds, but they added up to thousands (Herron, 2014). 
One notable trait of the Romanian protests is the visible role of 
the Orthodox Chruch. Often, clerics have accompanied events 
with religious ceremonies, prayers and songs. Rural Romania is 
deeply religious, and many priests have sided with the shale gas 
opposition. To some, fracking seems a biblical challenge, and in-
vestors like the devil. One priest who is a central figure in the anti-
fracking campaign, warned against “an invading army and foreign 
corporations; enemy chieftains and corporate managers; traitors 
and lobbyists” (Dale-Harris & Ursulean, 2013). An Orthodox 
bishop spoke in one sermon of “diabolical plan […] scouring the 
earth, poisoning the water, the springs created by God... This is a 
crime! A crime! A diabolical economic plan!” (Visan, 2013, p. 8). 
Officially, the church recommends that priests and monks do 
not personally get involved with public protests so not to divide 
the Orthodox community. But while it does not take a clear pro or 
con position on shale gas, the church has pressured the state to 
provide complete and correct information to local communities 
about shale gas exploration consequences, and advises priests to 
demand this from government officials (Stroe, 2014).  
As Vişan (2013) points out, this is the very first time since the 
fall of communism that the Romanian Orthodox Church has taken 
a stand on a secular issue together with civil society organizations 
(p. 8). The church thus joins “a heterogeneous movement whose 
environmental core is strengthened by opinion-leaders of left-
wing, nationalistic, or anti-capitalist beliefs” and “disgruntled cit-
izens who feel disempowered” and “a young generation of Roma-
nians who are fed up with Romania’s endemic corruption and lack 
of accountability of the current political elite” (p. 3). 
As in Bulgaria, anti-fracking activism must be understood in a 
broader social movement context. It evolved with citizen dissatis-
faction and moves to democratise politics. Social observers have 
noted that new mobilization (particularly of middle-class, edu-
cated young people and professionals) for various causes show an 
organized civil society has been forming in Romania.  
As Presadă (2012) notes, many studies have tried to explain why 
Romanian society has not developed a protest culture comparable 
to other European countries – for example, by pointing to Roma-
nians’ long-nurtured culture of obedience and fatalism. To ex-
perts’ surprise, the year 2012 would show a very different reality. 
Diverse groups came together, found common themes and leader-
ship; new actors became visible; and “a new agenda crystallized 
following the protest experience” which centered on demanding 
more democratic public involvement and participation, govern-
ment responsiveness, transparency, and accountability to citizens 
– all linked by an “awakening theme” (Presadă, 2012, p. 23-24). 
As Stoica (2013) points out, the emergence of a new civil soci-
ety still has to overcome many obstacles: the lack of a traditional 
associative culture and low citizen participation levels, feeble or-
ganisation, limited inter-group coordination and communication, 
and thorny relationships with state institutions which often do not 
respect civic rights. Outside of the party system, the government 
seldom takes NGO input into consideration in routine legislation 
and policy-making, Stoica finds. While groups may enjoy better 
access at the local level, at the national level it is limited. NGOs 
and the state “struggle to find a way towards a genuine dialogue.”  
In the shale gas case, obviously such dialogue has been wishful 
thinking. Ponta’s party and allies were responsive and cooperative 
only as long as they were in opposition. The rift widened again 
once they took power. It is no wonder that mobilising against the 
state, rather than negotiating and subtle influencing, becomes a 
strategic choice. The anti-fracking movement linked with many 
groups and causes, ranging from anti-austerity to anti-corruption 
to anti-corporate and anti-globalization to environmentalism and 
conservation, especially in mining and extraction sectors.  
One earlier case, the reopening of the Rosia Montana gold mine 
in Transylvania, had already sensitized Romanians for environ-
mental issues in the extraction industry; it also increased coopera-
tion and coordination among activist groups. Canadian investor 
Gabriel Resources had obtained a licence for Rosia Montana 15 
years ago but found the project blocked by citizen resistance, pol-
itics and regulatory obstruction (Chiriac, 2014).  
The environmentalists’ campaign, centering on the use of cya-
nide and intransparency of government action, has often overshad-
owed the shale gas debate. Public protests, in autumn 2013 bring-
ing 20,000 people to the streets of Bucharest, successfully pres-
sured politicians to delay a necessary mining reform law. This was 
another major U-turn. With next elections around the corner, min-
ing regulations are “a politically toxic issue,” and “forcing the is-
sue would have swelled the ranks of the protesters,” states 
Maplecroft political risk expert Florian Otto, who sees many sim-
ilarities to the shale gas issue (Otto, 2014).  
Given that the Ponta government was already taking an unpop-
ular stand on shale, opening up a second front was out of the ques-
tion. One may conclude that the government enjoys low public 
trust across the field of natural resources policy. 
 
Figure 4. “Shale gas 
war begins in Bar-
lad” – cover page of 
the tabloid newspa-
per, Evenimentul zi-
lei, 1 March 2013. 
The paper reported 
on the march of thou-
sands against shale 
gas exploration in 
late February. With 
dramatic imagery, 
the paper suggested 
that Russia is behind 
the demonstrations, 
undermining the ef-
fort to make energy 
independence a real-
ity for Romania. 
 
As in Bulgaria, the outburst of protests – and the seemingly 
well-oiled campaign machinery – surprised so many that all sorts 
of rumours and conspiracy theories spread about the “real” initia-
tors. One rumour in the media indicated that the Orthodox Church 
– which strongly denied it – was trying to recover land that it had 
earlier allowed Chevron to use (România libera, 2013; Stroe, 
2014).  
Other media publicised the claim, that “a Russian hand” was at 
play: Moscow and Gazprom were attempting to block shale gas 
extraction to keep the country on imports (Evenimentul zilei, 
2013, see figure 3). As in Bulgaria, solid evidence was missing. 
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Conclusions 
Bulgaria and Romania are very poor. They have structural en-
ergy problems, and they can ill afford to forego an economic stim-
ulus and foreign investment. But no shale gas fever emerged like 
in Poland. A prudent, careful debate about technology impact as-
sessment and environmental conditions also did not take place. In 
the deeply conservative rural heartland and in progressive cities 
alike, authorities and investors experienced a backlash unheard of 
before. The upsurge of protests has much to do with general rifts 
in society and the turbulent politics of these young democracies. 
Online and mass media lightened up with the controversy – it 
made a good story. NGOs and parties seized the opportunity to 
rally and mobilise a discounted public in a context of highly parti-
san competition and election politics. Politicians instrumentalised 
and, one may say, hijacked energy issues out of political oppor-
tunism and for symbolic purposes. Dogmatism was at play neither 
on the left nor the right (Groszkowski & Daborowski, 2012).  
Discourse, deliberation and choice are what a healthy democ-
racy is about. Sensing that their governments – and shale gas firms 
– supplied none of these, the public responded in kind: It denied a 
balanced, constructive attitude. Shale supporters and companies 
underestimated or ignored the necessities of broad communication 
efforts. They learned the hard way that social acceptance has to be 
earned and cannot be guaranteed by top-down decisions anymore, 
and that wobbly political support can collapse.  
The Bulgarian ban and Romanian moratorium were politically 
motivated and implemented without much thought to a coherent 
regulatory landscape. Neither government tried to work at the EU 
level toward a general policy on unconventionals. They could have 
influenced the European debate with credibility, given their direct 
exposure. Bulgarian and Romanian governments perceived the 
shale gas question as a purely domestic and political concern.  
Stereotypical accusations that Moscow is behind anti-fracking 
movements seem too simple explanations – which is not to deny 
that Russia and Gazprom have great interests at stake and may ex-
ert influence where they can. The more complex explanation may 
be that Romania and Bulgaria are experiencing a new phase in 
democratic evolution. As a practical matter, the EU, the U.S. and 
Western foundations have invested for years in civil society ca-
pacity-building: training by Western NGOs in public communica-
tion techniques, civic participation skills and political organising. 
That investment may have finally paid off: Citizen groups now put 
the tools to practice. Not Russia but the West have enabled them 
– mirroring, coincidently, Russia’s regular complaints that West-
ern involvement is behind political opposition in Russia and the 
Ukraine. The new socio-political realities in Romania and Bul-
garia may partly have been the result of a desired transformation. 
Bulgaria and Romania now travel on different roads. It is not 
inconceivable that either or both reverse again. Local confronta-
tions and the existence of the Bulgarian ban still hold considerable 
political risk for the Romanian government. On the other hand, if 
Romania successfully accesses its shale gas and develops it com-
mercially, this may sway Bulgaria to follow.  
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